Written by Howaida Awad Ahmed
Since February 28, when the war broke out between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, resulting in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah responded by launching rockets and drones at Israel. More than a year later, Israel had believed that Hezbollah had been effectively neutralized. However, fighting reignited along the southern front, followed by an Israeli ground invasion that advanced deep into Lebanese territory, reportedly reaching up to 600 kilometers. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz then declared that Israel intended to demolish and occupy all of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River.
After U.S. President Donald Trump announced an initial two-week ceasefire with Iran in April to prevent further deterioration of the global economy following the closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the ceasefire was expected to include Lebanon as well. However, Israel refused to halt its military operations in Lebanon.
Following a high-level meeting between Trump and Israeli officials, another ten-day ceasefire was agreed upon beginning on April 17. This was later extended by an additional three weeks and then by 45 days until May 15. Despite these extensions, Israeli attacks on Lebanon never ceased. Israeli ground forces crossed north of the Litani River for the first time since the 2006 war.
Trump reportedly became frustrated with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for undermining his negotiations with Iran. Nevertheless, the outcome was limited to maintaining Israeli forces within the buffer zone, despite Washington and Tehran reaching an understanding to halt hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon and Hezbollah.
On June 19, the United States, Israel, and Hezbollah reached an agreement through American, Qatari, and Iranian mediation. This was followed by the Lake Lucerne Summit in Switzerland, where the United States and Iran agreed on a sixty-day roadmap.
A deconfliction mechanism was then established in Lebanon, shifting the confrontation from the battlefield to a documented framework coordinated among all parties.
This important provision became a significant source of leverage for Iran, enabling it to activate Hezbollah in confronting Israel. Lebanon is now Iran’s only remaining pressure card on the Mediterranean after its influence in Syria weakened.
Preserving this negotiating asset is considered highly valuable for Iran in its broader confrontation with Washington.
This carefully managed campaign aims to preserve Lebanon as Iran’s final stronghold of Shiite influence through Hezbollah while tying Lebanon’s future to a broader agreement with Washington. The United States seeks to end Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel on American terms rather than those of Beirut.
As a result, Tehran now possesses a means of escalation against both the United States and Israel should they intensify actions against Shiite influence in Lebanon. Iran’s threats extend beyond the Strait of Hormuz to other strategic maritime chokepoints capable of disrupting the global economy and paralyzing international shipping.
Indeed, Israel reportedly suspended plans for an offensive against Beirut after Iran threatened to terminate negotiations with the United States. Nevertheless, Israeli operations against southern Lebanon continued.
Iran’s protection of Beirut did not extend to the south, where Hezbollah—its principal regional ally—is based.
Iran established a network of regional proxies, with Hezbollah serving as its central pillar. The organization’s primary purpose has been to defend Iran by automatically confronting Israel should Iran come under attack, or by retaliating against Israel if the United States attacks Iran.
However, this strategic equation has now changed. Iran has become increasingly compelled to respond directly in defense of Hezbollah rather than relying solely on it.
This represents a strategic setback. Consequently, Iran linked Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel to its own broader conflict with the United States, thereby separating Washington’s diplomatic track from Tel Aviv’s military objectives, as the two appeared to pursue different priorities—one favoring negotiations and the other military action.
Iran’s unilateral negotiations, conducted without recognizing the Lebanese state’s role, prompted Lebanon to file an official complaint against Iran before the United Nations Security Council, accusing Tehran of violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations by interfering in Lebanon’s sovereign decisions and drawing the country into war.
As a result, Iran now faces serious concerns over losing influence in the Lebanese file and over the possibility that Lebanon could enter into direct negotiations with Israel independently.
An equally significant indicator is the economic dimension. Following the Switzerland summit, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that Tehran had secured exemptions for its oil and petrochemical exports, along with the lifting of restrictions on its ports, the release of frozen assets, and a new reconstruction and development plan to repair the damage caused by the war.
Iran has linked the Lebanon file to a broad package of economic gains, while ongoing tensions in southern Lebanon continue to serve as leverage for extracting concessions regarding oil exports and enriched uranium.
On the other side, American interests, Israel’s security, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear agreement, the Abraham Accords, and Lebanon all remain highly sensitive and interconnected issues that could trigger renewed escalation at any time.
Conclusion
The weakness of the Lebanese state and the limited capabilities of its army have turned Lebanon into a bargaining chip on the negotiating table. Tehran is expected to continue shaping the Lebanese scene even if Hezbollah’s influence declines. Hezbollah’s weapons remain caught between efforts at disarmament and continued operational use, particularly as supply routes from Iran through Syria have significantly weakened or disappeared altogether.
The apparent political differences between Trump and Netanyahu may give the impression that they oppose one another. However, according to this analysis, both remain committed to a long-term strategy aimed at expanding Israeli control over Lebanese territory.
The deaths of approximately 5,000 people, the injury of more than 13,000 others, and the occupation of villages near the Litani River represent, in this view, only the beginning of further territorial expansion. The analysis argues that agreements with Iran will not be sufficient to protect its regional allies, particularly given the Lebanese president’s firm rejection of Iranian involvement in negotiations concerning Lebanon’s sovereign affairs.
